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The application of alibi witness scenarios to deception detection has been overlooked.  
Experiment 1 was a study of the verifiability approach in which truth-telling pairs completed a 
mission together, whereas in lying pairs one individual completed this mission alone and the 
other individual committed a mock theft.  All pairs were instructed to convince the interviewer 
that they completed the mission together by writing individual statements on their own 
followed by a collective statement together as a pair.  In the individual statements, truth-telling 
pairs provided more checkable details that demonstrated they completed the mission together 
than lying pairs, whereas lying pairs provided more uncheckable details than truth-telling pairs.  
The collective statements made truth-telling pairs provide significantly more checkable details 
that demonstrated they were together in comparison to the individual statements, whereas no 
effect was obtained for lying pairs.  Receiver Operating Characteristic curves revealed high 
accuracy rates for discriminating between truths and lies using the verifiability approach across 
all statement types.  Experiment 2 was a lie detection study whereby observers’ abilities to 
discriminate between truths and lies using the verifiability approach were examined.  This 
revealed that applying the verifiability approach to collective statements improved observers’ 
ability to accurately detect deceit. We suggest that the verifiability approach could be used as 




Keywords:  verifiability approach, alibi witness, collective interviewing, lie detection, 
consistency. 
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Applying the Verifiability Approach to Deception Detection in Alibi Witness Situations 
An alibi witness (often referred to as a person corroborator) is defined as someone 
who can provide an account of the whereabouts of a suspect at a location other than the crime 
scene at the time the crime took place (Burke, Turtle, & Olsen, 2007; Dahl & Price, 2012).  
Alibi witnesses are frequently used by defendants in court (Burke & Turtle, 2003).  However, 
one problem with interpreting alibi witness evidence is that it can sometimes be false.  Given 
that 61% of people believed they could find a false alibi witness to corroborate their story 
(Culhane, Hosch, & Kehn, 2008), that 82% of people reported they would lie for a romantic 
partner, and that 68% reported they would lie for their oldest/best friend (Hosch, Culhane, 
Jolly, Chavez, & Shaw, 2011), false alibi witnesses are likely to be common.   
Scenarios involving alibi witnesses differ from those that do not because there is not 
only a suspect to question, but also an alibi witness. The alibi witness is likely to be telling 
the truth about his/her whereabouts and activities, but lying about being with the suspect.  In 
such a case, the alibi witness is telling an embedded lie (see Vrij, Granhag & Porter, 2010).  
Such lies are difficult to uncover and require specific lie detection techniques, such as the 
verifiability approach (Nahari & Vrij, 2014).  
Despite investigators often having to determine whether the evidence provided by an 
alibi witness is true or false (Culhane et al., 2013), little deception research has explored 
investigations involving an alibi witness and how one can tell whether the alibi witness 
evidence is true or false.  We carried out two experiments.  The first experiment applies the 
verifiability approach to alibi witness scenarios and the second experiment explores whether 
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observers (i.e. lay persons whom make judgements about the veracity status of statements) 
can accurately apply the verifiability approach to correctly classify the statements from alibi 
witnesses as true or false.  
Verifiability Approach  
 The Verifiability Approach was developed by Nahari, Vrij and Fisher (2014a).  This 
approach is based on two assumptions that result in a dilemma for liars.  First, research has 
frequently demonstrated that more detailed accounts signify truthfulness (see Amado, Arce, 
Fariña, & Vilariño, 2016 for a review) and, as a result, liars want to provide numerous details 
in order to make an honest impression (Nahari, Vrij, & Fisher, 2012).  Second, liars are 
simultaneously motivated to avoid mentioning details that can be checked and result in the 
investigator uncovering their lies (Nahari et al., 2012).  To accommodate these conflicting 
aims, liars employ a strategy that focuses on including details that cannot be checked 
(referred to as unverifiable or uncheckable details, e.g. “I saw some joggers in the park”), and 
avoid including details that can be checked (referred to as verifiable or checkable details, e.g. 
“As I entered the park at 9:15am, I bumped into my friend, George, from Rugby”; Nahari, 
Vrij, & Fisher, 2014a, 2014b).   
The current study focuses on the special case in which pairs of suspects are 
interrogated together, so-called collective interviewing.  Collective interviewing can be used 
in addition to individual interviewing and enables social indicators of deceit to be examined 
(Vernham & Vrij, 2015), that is, cues to deceit associated with how the group members 
interact and communicate with one another (Driskell, Salas, & Driskell, 2012; Vernham, Vrij, 
Mann, Leal, & Hillman, 2014; Vrij et al., 2012).  Currently, police typically conduct 
individual interviews during investigations regardless of the number of interviewees to be 
questioned.  However, collective interviewing is implemented in some existing procedures.  
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For example, in the United Kingdom, immigration officers occasionally use collective 
interviewing after individual interviewing when attempting to uncover sham marriages 
(Home Office, 2013), and in Israel, police detectives sometimes interview multiple suspects 
collectively if they have provided contradicting versions of events during their individual 
interviews.  Finally, collective interviews are often carried out following individual 
interviews within some International airports if an individual travelling as part of a group, or 
if a whole group of individuals, raise suspicion.  By extending the research agenda to include 
collective interviewing, we can uncover new applied contexts where collective interviewing 
may be appropriate and can therefore inform on best practice (see Vernham & Vrij, 2015 for 
a review of collective interviewing).  For the purpose of the current study, verifiability is 
defined as any detail that proves the pair (i.e. the suspect and the alibi witness) were together 
at a location other than the crime scene at the time the crime took place.  Hence, the alibi 
witness merely saying s/he was with the suspect at the time of the crime does not count as 
verifiability.  However, if the alibi witness mentions a third aspect to them being together 
(e.g. another person or CCTV) then this would count as verifiability.   
Nahari and Vrij (2014) applied the verifiability approach to pairs by considering the 
case of alibi witnesses. It was found that 88% of the pairs could be correctly classified by the 
verifiability approach.  The current study adds to the work of Nahari and Vrij (2014) in 
several ways:  First, the participants in Nahari and Vrij (2014) only had to write collective 
statements, whereas the participants in the first experiment of the current study were required 
to write both an individual and a collective statement.  This reflects real life better: When 
collective interviewing is implemented in practice, it is generally used as a follow-up to 
individual interviewing.  Second, Nahari and Vrij (2014) only measured checkable details 
that demonstrated the pair were together.  The current study had three categories of verifiable 
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details:  (1) Checkable details that demonstrate the pair were together (i.e. details that can be 
verified by an investigator and prove the pair were together at the time the crime was 
committed), (2) Checkable details that do not demonstrate the pair were together (i.e. details 
that can be verified by an investigator, but only prove that one member of the pair was at a 
location other than the crime scene at the time the crime was committed, not both members of 
the pair), and (3) Uncheckable details (i.e. details that cannot be verified during an 
investigation).  This division of verifiable details into three categories is important because (i) 
the first category allows for the replication of the findings obtained by Nahari and Vrij 
(2014); (ii) the second category is more applicable to alibi witness research because it allows 
us to take into account the fact that even lying alibi witnesses might provide checkable details 
that demonstrate their activities, but not necessarily that they carried them out with their 
partner; and (iii) the third category allows us to explore whether liars compensate for the lack 
of reporting verifiable details by reporting more unverifiable details, which also enables us to 
examine the proportion of the checkable details in the statement(s), as a within-subjects 
measurement.  Recently, researchers have started to discuss the importance of within-subjects 
measures in verbal lie detection (Nahari & Vrij, 2014, 2015; Vrij, 2016).  The key argument 
is that verbal cues that appear as highly diagnostic in verbal deception research where 
veracity differences are assessed at a between-subjects (i.e. group) level (e.g. the number of 
details liars provide compared to truth-tellers; Amado, Arce, & Fariña, 2015) are of little 
value in real life contexts where assessments are made at a within-subjects (i.e. individual) 
level, due to large individual differences in the reporting of such cues (e.g. the amount of 
details someone typically provides).  Thus, verbal cues (e.g. proportion of checkable details) 
need to be developed that control for these individual differences in providing details (Vrij, 
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2016).  Finally, unlike the current study, Nahari and Vrij (2014) did not incorporate an 
additional experiment to test the validity of the verifiability approach as a lie detection tool.  
Experiment 1: Hypotheses 
It is hypothesised that truth-telling pairs will provide significantly more checkable 
details that demonstrate the pair were together in both the individual and collective 
statements than lying pairs (Hypothesis 1).  Although both truth-telling pairs and lying pairs 
are expected to provide many uncheckable details, it is predicted that when the proportion of 
uncheckable details is calculated (i.e. the total number of uncheckable details divided by the 
total number of checkable and uncheckable details), lying pairs will provide significantly 
more uncheckable details than truth-telling pairs in both the individual and collective 
statements (Hypothesis 2).  No difference is expected between pairs of truth-tellers and pairs 
of liars in terms of checkable details that do not demonstrate the pair were together because 
both truth-telling pairs and lying pairs will have had at least one member of the pair complete 
the non-criminal activities.  Thus, both truth-telling pairs and lying pairs will be able to show 
through the provision of checkable detail that at least one member of their pair completed the 
non-criminal activities.   
It is further hypothesised that truth-telling pairs will provide significantly more 
checkable details that demonstrate they were together in the collective statement compared to 
the individual statements (Hypothesis 3).  This is because, during the collective statement, 
joint recall is occurring with truth-telling pairs focusing on recollecting shared events (see 
literature on transactive memory; Hollingshead, 1998; Wegner, 1987) and we believe that this 
joint recall will reflect itself in the collective statement as checkable details that demonstrate 
the pair were together.  This pattern will emerge significantly less for lying pairs because they 
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cannot recall actual shared memories leading them to merely repeat details from their 
individual statements.  
Experiment 1: Method 
Participants 
The current research was approved by a Science Faculty Ethics Committee within a 
U.K. University.  A total of 120 participants (30 truth-telling pairs and 30 lying pairs) took 
part in this first experiment.  However, one lying pair was excluded as they did not correctly 
follow the instructions of the experiment.  The mean age of the remaining 118 participants 
was 24.38 years (SD = 10.48), 34 were male and 84 were female.  Of the pairs, 32 were 
female pairs, 7 were male pairs, and 20 were mixed gender pairs.  
Design 
This first experiment used a mixed design with Veracity (truth versus lie) as the only 
between-subjects factor and Statement (individual versus collective) as the only within-
subjects factor.  The proportion of checkable details (proof pair together), checkable details 
(other), and uncheckable details were the three dependent variables. 
Procedure 
Participants were recruited via online advertisements, the university staff and student 
portals, and word of mouth.  All participants were told prior to signing up to the experiment 
that it was an experiment investigating the interactions occurring between friends and 
therefore they were required to sign up in pairs. 
Upon arrival at the Psychology department, all pairs of friends were required to read 
and sign an informed consent form and were randomly assigned to one of the two veracity 
conditions.  They were told by the experimenter that they were going to complete a task 
together (truth-telling pairs) or complete separate tasks (lying pairs).   
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Truth-telling pairs were sent on a mission around a nearby park together.  The park 
has many features, such as a children’s play area, an animal enclosure, and several war 
monuments.  Truth-telling pairs were provided with instructions of what to do on their 
mission around the park, a map with directions of how to get there, a map of the park itself, 
and a task sheet asking seven questions about different areas of the park.  Their mission was 
to go around the park and work together as a pair to answer the seven questions on the task 
sheet in the order in which they were asked.  Despite the experimenter requesting participants 
to answer the questions in a specific order, approximately 17% of participants mentioned that 
they did not follow the tasks in chronological order because they accidentally came across an 
answer to a later question first.  The maps provided could be used to help them locate the 
answers they required.  Questions on the task sheet included “How many slides are there in 
the children’s play area?”, “Name five animals that live within the enclosure at the centre of 
the park”, and “What is the date on which the Chinese bell monument was captured?”.  Pairs 
were instructed to stay together at all times, working together to answer each of the questions.  
The questions could only be answered correctly if the pair actually went to the specific places 
within the park, providing some ground truth that the truth-telling pairs did do the entire 
mission.  Although it could be that participants searched on the internet for the answers (e.g. 
using their mobile phone), they would only have been able to find answers to three of the 
seven questions.  When asked, no participants admitted to having used the internet to obtain 
any of the answers.  On completion of the tasks, the pairs returned to the Psychology 
department.  On returning to the Psychology department, they handed the experimenter the 
task sheet, which enabled the experimenter to check that they had completed each of the 
tasks.  When back at the department, the experimenter informed the pair that a crime had 
taken place and that one of them matched the description provided of the person who was 
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seen leaving the office in which the crime had occurred (the pair member chosen to match the 
description was picked at random by the experimenter).  Therefore, this individual became 
the ‘suspect’ (who was innocent) and his or her friend became the ‘true alibi witness’.    
Lying pairs were separated and randomly assigned a mission.  One individual was 
instructed to do exactly what the truth-telling pairs were asked to do, but on his or her own 
rather than with his or her friend.  The other individual was instructed to commit a mock 
crime on his or her own.  S/he was given a key and required to follow directions to a locked 
office in the Psychology department.  S/he was to unlock the office, steal £20 from a purse on 
the desk within the office, lock the office and return to the experimenter with the £20.  The 
£20 was returned to the experimenter following completion of the study.  S/he was to do this 
as quickly as possible and without being seen.  When both individuals had completed their 
tasks, they were reunited as a pair and informed that a crime had been reported and that the 
individual who had actually completed the mock crime matched the description provided of 
the person who was seen leaving the office in which the crime occurred.  Therefore, this 
individual became the ‘suspect’ (who was guilty) and his or her friend was instructed be a 
‘false alibi witness’.   
The task given to all pairs was to convince an investigator that they were together at 
all times when the crime was committed.  They were instructed to state that they had been 
completing a mission around the park together at the time the money was stolen.  Therefore, 
truth-telling pairs (both the ‘suspect’ and the ‘true alibi witness’) were required to tell the 
truth about their whereabouts and activities at the time of the crime.  The lying pairs on the 
other hand were required to lie, with the suspect having to lie entirely about his or her 
whereabouts and activities, claiming that s/he was with the ‘false alibi witness’, whereas his 
or her friend (the ‘false alibi witness’) had to tell the truth about his or her whereabouts and 
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activities but lie about being alone when completing the mission – That is, the ‘false alibi 
witness’ had to say that s/he completed the mission together with the ‘suspect’ in order to try 
to exonerate his or her friend.  The ‘false alibi witness’ was made aware that his or her friend 
(the ‘suspect’) had stolen the money and therefore s/he was intentionally lying about being 
with his or her friend at the time the crime was committed.   
All pairs were given as much time as they wanted to prepare for questioning and to 
get their stories straight.  They were told to focus on discussing how they were going to prove 
their own innocence or the innocence of their partner.  All pairs were informed prior to their 
preparation talks that they would be required to write a statement on their own and then a 
second statement together as a pair.  Therefore, if differences between truth-tellers and liars 
were to emerge, this would not be because the individual or collective statements took the 
pairs by surprise.   
Once the pairs stated they were ready to be questioned, they were separated and 
individually completed pre-questioning questionnaires.  These were completed to get an 
understanding of the degree to which pairs had prepared for questioning and whether the 
preparation discussions differed between truth-telling pairs and lying pairs.  The pre-
questioning questionnaire asked participants to rate on 7-point Likert scales the thoroughness 
(from [1] incomplete to [7] thorough), sufficiency (from [1] insufficient to [7] sufficient), 
quality (from [1] very poor to [7] very good), and usefulness (from [1] pointless to [7] useful) 
of their preparation discussion.  It also asked the participants to rate how much they discussed 
with their partner about what to say during questioning (ranging from [1] not at all to [7] 
thoroughly).   
Subsequently, each member of the pair separately typed up individual statements on a 
laptop answering the following question: ‘Describe in as much detail as possible what you 
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were doing at the time the crime took place.  Think about your whereabouts, your activities, 
the people you were with, what you saw, what you heard, how you felt etc.’.  The statement 
system was set up on the laptop to look like the statement was being sent to an investigator.  
That is, all participants were manipulated to believe that the investigator was receiving their 
statements once complete.  Once both members of the pair had completed their individual 
statements, they were put together to write a collective statement answering the same 
question.  The pairs could speak freely to one another and could choose who typed up the 
statement.  They were reminded prior to writing the individual statements and prior to writing 
the collective statement that their task was to convince an investigator that they were together 
the whole time around the park at the time the crime occurred.  They were led to believe that 
the investigator was receiving their written statements (both individual and then collective) 
once they clicked submit on the laptop within the statement system.   
The participants were not informed about any information the investigator would be 
looking for in their statements.  To motivate participants to perform well during the 
experiment, they were told that if they were believed by the investigator they would each 
receive £10.  However, if they were not believed they would receive no money and would be 
required to write a further statement about their whereabouts and activities at the time the 
crime took place.  To ensure that the experiment was ethical and equal for all participants, the 
experimenter told them at the end of the experiment that the investigator believed they were 
telling the truth, and so all participants were paid £10 each.   
Following participation, a post-questioning questionnaire was completed individually 
and at this stage all participants were instructed to be truthful about their experience of 
writing the statements.  In this questionnaire, participants were asked to rate on a 7-point 
Likert scale from [1] not at all motivated to [7] extremely motivated, the extent to which they 
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felt motivated to appear convincing during questioning.  They were also asked to rate their 
confidence in receiving £10 and their confidence about having to write a further statement 
(both on 7-point Likert scales from [1] none at all to [7] very likely).  Additionally, 
participants were asked to rate on 7-point Likert scales (ranging from [1] easy to do to [7] 
difficult to do) the extent to which they found writing their individual statement and the 
collective statement easy or difficult to do.  Finally, to explore how honest participants were 
in their statements, they rated on scales from 0% to 100% with 10% intervals the extent to 
which they had told the truth during the individual statement and then the collective 
statement.   
To make sure there were no significant confounding differences between the truth-
telling pairs and lying pairs, all pairs were asked, in the post-questioning questionnaire, about 
their knowledge of the park, how they perceived their level of friendship with their study 
partner, and how long the pair had been friends for.   
Once the post-questioning questionnaire was completed by both members of the pair, 
they were each given a debriefing form and provided with the opportunity to ask the 
experimenter questions.  The whole study took pairs of participants between 60 minutes and 
90 minutes to complete.   
Coding Statements for Verifiability 
The statements were coded by a rater who was blind to the hypotheses and veracity 
status of the pairs.  The three dependent variables (checkable details (proof pair together), 
checkable details (other), uncheckable details) were coded for each of the individual 
statements and the collective statements separately.  The two individual statements of each 
pair were then compared and duplicates of checkable or uncheckable details between the 
individual statements were removed allowing for one total score from the two individual 
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statements to be calculated for each variable.  The removal of duplicate details between 
individual statements of the same pair needed to be done to remove the confound of there 
being only one collective statement and two individual statements and to prevent repetition 
between individuals of the same pair from distorting the data.  Overall, this meant that each 
pair obtained two total frequency scores for each of the three verifiable variables, one score 
from the individual statements and one score from the collective statement.   
Checkable details (proof pair together) was the number of details provided by the 
participant(s) that could be verified and demonstrated the pair were together at the time of the 
crime (e.g. “We bumped into our tutor Anne and spoke to her for a bit” or “There was CCTV 
in Guildhall square that would have picked us up”).    
Checkable details (other) was the number of details provided by the participant(s) that 
could be verified but did not necessarily demonstrate that the pair were together at the time of 
the crime.  For example, providing details that show that one member of the pair was at the 
park but not necessarily the other member of the pair (e.g. “The park warden was feeding the 
animals whilst I was there…He saw me writing down the animals on my answer sheet” or “I 
saw a litter picker in the park who questioned me about what I was doing”).   
Uncheckable details was the number of details provided by the participant(s) that 
could not be verified (e.g. “We spent two whole minutes staring at the guinea pigs before 
moving on” or “There were no children in the play area when we walked past”).   
Each type of detail was converted into a proportion variable by dividing each type of 
verifiable detail by the total number of all three types of verifiable details.  For example: 
Proportion of checkable details (proof pair together) = total checkable details (proof pair 
together) / {total checkable details (proof pair together) + total checkable details (other) + 
total uncheckable details}.  A relative measurement was used because we wanted to take into 
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account individual differences in the richness of details (e.g. Nahari & Pazulo [2015] found 
gender differences in the richness of detail when telling the truth).  Also, truth-telling pairs 
(M = 209.95, SD = 120.93) provided significantly more details overall in their statements 
compared to lying pairs (M = 153.65, SD = 58.79), t(116) = 3.20, p = .002, d = 0.77.  For this 
reason, we needed to use a within-subjects measure (i.e. the proportion of (un)verifiable 
details). 
A second coder, also blind to the hypotheses and veracity status of the pairs, coded 
the individual and collective statements obtained from 16 pairs for the total number of times 
each of the three verifiable variables occurred.  Intra-class correlation coefficients (ICCs) 
were then calculated between the two individual raters.  The inter-rater reliability between the 
two coders was very good for both the individual and collective statements with each of the 
ICCs demonstrating strong agreement between the two raters (checkable details (proof pair 
together): ICCs = .82 and .91; checkable details (other): ICCs = .88 and .89; and uncheckable 
details: ICCs = .90 and .82).   
Analysis of Data 
 Bayesian analyses, using JASP software, were conducted to supplement all statistical 
analyses, with the default Cauchy's prior of .707 used for the Bayesian t-tests (Lakens, 2016).  
Therefore, within the statistical analyses, we report not only the Cohen d’s as a measure of 
effect size but also the Bayes factor, BF10, for main effects.  Bayes factors (BFs) enable us to 
quantify the evidence for the alternative hypothesis (presence of an effect) relative to the null 
hypothesis (absence of an effect), and vice versa.  That is, as BF10 increases, there is more 
evidence in support of the alternative hypothesis, but the inverse yields the opposite (i.e. 1/ 
BF10) and provides more evidence in support of the null hypothesis (see Jaroz & Wiley, 
2014).  In line with the cut-off points outlined by Jeffreys (1961), BFs between 1 and 3 
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suggest weak evidence, BFs between 3 and 10 suggest strong evidence, and BFs > 10 
indicate very strong evidence for the alternative hypothesis relative to the null hypothesis.  If 
we obtain evidentially weak Bayes factors suggesting an absence of evidence, then the results 
can be judged as anecdotal or inconclusive (Lee & Wagenmakers, 2013).  
Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC; Mossman, 1994) curves were created to 
evaluate the efficiency of the verifiability approach for detecting deceit.  ROC curves reflect 
the degree of separation between the distributions of the proportion of checkable to 
uncheckable details and the detection of truth-telling versus lying participants.  That is, a 
ROC curve plots the rate of true positives against the rate of false positives for the proportion 
of (un)checkable details and represents the trade off in specificity that occurs as sensitivity 
increases.  The Area Under the Curve (AUC) of the ROC graph is the index for interpreting 
the overall predictive validity of the verifiability approach.  AUC values of 0.5 correspond to 
no-better-than chance prediction and values of 1.0 correspond to perfect efficiency.  In 
general, an AUC of 0.5 is therefore a lack of ability to discriminate between truths and lies, 
0.7 to 0.8 suggests acceptable discrimination, 0.8 to 0.9 suggests excellent discrimination, 
and more than 0.9 suggests outstanding discrimination (Hosmer & Lemeshow, 2000). 
Experiment 1: Results 
Pre-questioning Questionnaire 
Preparation time was offered to all participants.  However, only six truth-telling pairs 
compared to all 29 lying pairs chose to prepare prior to writing their statements.  This finding 
is frequently obtained in deception detection studies (e.g. Vernham et al., 2014; Vrij et al., 
2009) and is not surprising:  Truth-telling pairs merely rely on memory to recall events, 
something which lying pairs cannot do because the events did not actually occur.  Hence, 
lying pairs rely on a fabricated story that they need to plan and collaborate on, in order to get 
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their story straight, keep details simple, and avoid contradictions (Vrij, Mann, Leal, & 
Granhag, 2010).  Of those pairs who did choose to prepare, the time spent preparing ranged 
from 1.02 minutes to 19.02 minutes.  A t-test revealed that lying pairs (M = 7.90 mins, SD = 
3.84) spent significantly longer preparing than truth-telling pairs (M = 2.14 mins, SD = 1.39), 
t(33) = 3.59, p = .001, d = 1.99, BF10 = 6.137
e+11.  This finding is not surprising either:  It 
simply reflects the fact that liars have more work to do to get their story straight than truth-
tellers.   
A one-way (Veracity: truth vs. lie) between-subjects MANOVA was conducted to 
examine if there were any significant differences between truth-tellers and liars in terms of (i) 
how they rated their preparation discussion prior to writing their statements and (ii) how 
much they discussed with their partner about what to include in their written statements.  The 
MANOVA revealed a significant multivariate main effect for Veracity, Wilks’ λ = .74, F(5, 
62) = 4.39, p = .002, ηp
2 = .26.  Significant univariate main effects for Veracity were obtained 
with liars rating the preparation discussion as significantly more useful and more sufficient 
than truth-tellers.   Liars also reported discussing with their partner about what to write in 
their statements significantly more thoroughly than truth-tellers.  No significant differences 
were found between truth-tellers and liars in terms of how they rated their preparation 
discussion for thoroughness or quality (see Table 1). 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
Post-questioning Questionnaire: Motivation, Manipulation Checks, and Writing 
Statements 
The vast majority of participants self-reported that they were motivated to appear 
convincing during the interview, with 85.6% of the sample scoring 5 or higher on the 7-point 
Likert scale.   
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A one-way (Veracity: truth vs. lie) between-subjects MANOVA was conducted to 
investigate whether there were any significant differences between truth-tellers and liars in 
terms of their self-reporting of motivation, confidence, how difficult they found writing the 
individual and collective statements, and how much they told the truth on both the individual 
and collective statements.  The MANOVA revealed significant multivariate main effects for 
Veracity, Wilks’ λ = .07, F(7, 108) = 214.09, p < .001, ηp
2 = .93.  As shown in Table 1, 
significant univariate main effects for Veracity were obtained with liars reporting 
significantly more motivation to appear convincing than truth-tellers.  In terms of confidence, 
truth-tellers reported that they were more confident than liars that they would receive £10, 
whereas liars were more confident than truth-tellers that they would have to write a further 
statement.  Furthermore, liars found writing both the individual statement and the collective 
statement significantly more difficult than truth-tellers.  Finally, on both the individual 
statement and collective statement, truth-tellers reported staying closer to the truth than liars 
(see Table 1).   
To ensure that any findings obtained in the current experiment were the result of 
Veracity and not the result of participants in one condition knowing the park better than 
participants in the other condition, an independent samples t-test was conducted to compare 
whether there was a significant difference between truth-tellers and liars in regard to their 
self-reported knowledge of the park.  No significant difference was found (p = .638,  BF10 = 
0.27).  Additionally, to ensure that any findings obtained were not confounded by the level of 
friendship of each pair, a one-way MANOVA was conducted on the participants’ self-report 
data about how friendly they were with their study partner.  The MANOVA indicated that 
there were no significant differences between truth-telling pairs and lying pairs in terms of 
how they rated their friendship on four 7-point Likert scales that measured; (i) labelling (from 
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[1] strangers to [7] best friends); (ii) closeness (from [1] distant to [7] intimate); (iii) 
importance (from [1] unimportant to [7] important); and (iv) trustworthiness (from [1] 
distrusting to [7] trusting) (means for truth-tellers ranged from 5.83 to 6.63; means for liars 
ranged from 5.55 to 6.40; p-values ranged from .086 to .218, BF10’s ranged from 0.39 to 
0.75).  Finally, to ensure that any findings obtained were not confounded by the self-reported 
length of friendship of each pair, an independent samples t-test was conducted.  This revealed 
that there was no significant difference between pairs of truth-tellers and pairs of liars in 
terms of friendship length (p = .094, BF10 = 0.88). 
Hypotheses Testing: Proportion of (Un)Checkable Details  
Three two-way mixed ANOVAs were conducted on the pair level.  Since the 
dependent variables of these analyses were proportion measures, they were inter-dependent.  
To deal with this issue, Bonferroni correction was applied (ɑ = .05 / 3).  Hence, each analysis 
was tested using a required significance level of .017.   
The first 2 x 2 mixed design ANOVA was conducted with Veracity (truth vs. lie) as 
the between-subjects factor, Statement (individual vs. collective) as the within-subjects 
factor, and proportion of checkable details (proof pair together) as the dependent variable.  
The ANOVA revealed that truth-telling pairs (M = .32, SD = .14, 95% CI [.29, .38]) provided 
a significantly higher proportion of checkable details (proof pair together) than lying pairs (M 
= .15, SD = .11, 95% CI [.10, .20]), F(1, 57) = 28.25, p < .001, ηp
2 = .33, d = 1.35, 95% CI 
[0.71, 1.83], and a BF10 of 10760.76 provided very strong evidence for this effect.  
Furthermore, a significantly higher proportion of checkable details (proof pair together) were 
provided in the collective statement (M = .28, SD = .23, 95% CI [.23, .33]) compared to the 
individual statement (M = .20, SD = .15, 95% CI [.17, .24]), F(1, 57) = 10.32, p = .002, ηp
2 = 
.15, d = 0.41, 95% CI [0.02, 0.75], and a BF10 of 20.12 again provided very strong support for 
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this effect.  Finally, a significant Statement X Veracity interaction effect was obtained for 
checkable details (proof pair together), F(1, 57) = 7.20, p = .010, ηp
2 = .11.  A simple main 
effects analysis demonstrated that the collective statement led to a significantly higher 
proportion of checkable details (proof pair together) than the individual statements for pairs 
of truth-tellers, but no such difference was found between the individual statements and the 
collective for pairs of liars.  The Bayes factor analyses for these simple main effects showed 
very strong support for the truth-telling pairs, whilst also showing weak, inconclusive 
evidence for the absence of a simple main effect in lying pairs (see Table 2).  These findings 
provide support for Hypotheses 1 and 3. 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
The second 2 x 2 mixed design ANOVA was conducted with Veracity (truth vs. lie) 
as the between-subjects factor, Statement (individual vs. collective) as the within-subjects 
factor, and proportion of checkable details (other) as the dependent variable.  The ANOVA 
revealed that there was no significant difference between truth-telling pairs and lying pairs in 
terms of the proportion of checkable details (other) provided (p = .124, BF10 = 0.51).  There 
was also no significant difference between the individual and collective statements in terms 
of proportion of checkable details (other) (p = .082, BF10 = 0.61) nor was there a significant 
Statement X Veracity interaction effect (p = .536).  The Bayes factor analyses for checkable 
details (other) suggest weak, insufficient evidence for the absence of both Veracity and 
Statement main effects. 
The third 2 x 2 mixed design ANOVA was conducted with Veracity (truth vs. lie) as 
the between-subjects factor, Statement (individual vs. collective) as the within-subjects 
factor, and proportion of uncheckable details as the dependent variable.  The ANOVA 
revealed that lying pairs (M = .59, SD = .20, 95% CI [.52, .65]) provided a significantly 
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higher proportion of uncheckable details compared to truth-telling pairs (M = .36, SD = .10, 
95% CI [.29, .42]), F(1, 57) = 26.12, p < .001, ηp
2 = .31, d = 1.46, 95% CI [0.81, 1.94], BF10 = 
33138.18.  There was no significant difference between the individual and collective 
statements in terms of proportion of uncheckable details (p = .087, BF10 = 0.60) nor was there 
a significant Statement X Veracity interaction effect (p = .217).  The Bayes factor analyses 
for uncheckable details showed very strong evidence for the Veracity main effect as well as 
showing weak, inconclusive evidence for the absence of the Statement main effect.  These 
findings support Hypothesis 2.   
Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC) 
As no significant findings were obtained for checkable details (other), the ROC 
curves were conducted for the proportion of checkable (proof pair together) to uncheckable 
details only (i.e. total checkable details (proof pair together) divided by total uncheckable 
details).  The ROC curves were first conducted regardless of statement type and then 
depending on statement type (i.e. individual vs. collective).  All ROC curves were significant 
at p < .001 with AUC values ranging from .789 to .895 (see Table 3).  Hence, the proportion 
of checkable to uncheckable details was predictive of veracity across all statement types, 
which provides strong evidence in support of the efficiency of the verifiability approach as a 
systematic lie detection tool that can accurately discriminate between pairs of liars and pairs 
of truth-tellers.  
Experiment 2: Discriminating between Truth-Telling Pairs and Lying Pairs 
In support of Hypotheses 1 and 2, truth-telling pairs, compared to lying pairs, 
included a higher proportion of checkable details that demonstrated the pair were together in 
both the individual and collective statements, whereas, lying pairs, compared to truth-telling 
pairs, included a higher proportion of uncheckable details in both the individual and 
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collective statements.  The proportion of checkable details that demonstrated the pair were 
together increased between the individual and collective statements for truth-telling pairs but 
not for lying pairs, supporting Hypothesis 3.  Additionally, ROC analyses demonstrated the 
high potential of the verifiability approach for correctly classifying pairs of participants based 
on veracity.  
The fact that the verifiability approach revealed cues to deceit does not automatically 
mean that observers will be able to accurately discriminate between pairs of truth-tellers and 
pairs of liars when informed about the verifiability approach.  ROC curves, whilst objective, 
do not take into account human bias and subjectivity when predicting the veracity status of 
the participants.  This second experiment therefore investigated; (i) whether the verifiability 
approach could be used by observers to make accurate veracity judgements regarding single 
cases; (ii) whether observers could apply the verifiability approach quickly and easily; (iii) 
whether making the veracity judgement was uninfluenced by other cues (e.g. consistency); 
and (iv) whether the ability of observers to correctly classify pairs based on veracity was 
dependent upon whether they read individual statements, a collective statement, or a 
combination of individual and collective statements.  This second experiment is therefore a 
relevant addition to the previous experiment as it could be argued that the verifiability 
approach is more valuable if observers are able to appropriately apply the approach and 
identify (un)checkable details within statements.  
We expect that observers will find it easier to apply the verifiability approach when 
reading a collective statement compared to when reading individual statements or a 
combination of individual and collective statements.  When observers have access to multiple 
statements they automatically rely on verbal consistency between statements (even when 
instructed not to do so), interpreting inconsistent statements as deceitful and consistent 
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statements as truthful (Granhag & Strömwall, 2000; Strömwall, Granhag, & Jonsson, 2003).  
However, despite consistency being the strongest cue that observers pay attention to when 
attempting to detect deceit (Potter & Brewer, 1999; Strömwall & Granhag, 2003; Vrij, 2008), 
research shows that both lay people and legal professionals utilise the consistency cue 
incorrectly.  That is, contrary to popular belief, lying pairs, although more vague, actually 
appear as consistent if not more consistent than truth-telling pairs.  This is because lying pairs 
provide an alibi and pre-plan their responses (Granhag, Strömwall & Jonsson, 2003; 
Strömwall, et al., 2003; Vrij, Mann, et al., 2010), whereas truth-telling pairs rely on memory, 
which is naturally reconstructive in nature (Bartlett, 1932; Loftus, 2005).  This relationship 
between consistency and deception has been illustrated within the ‘repeat vs. reconstruct’ 
hypothesis proposed by Granhag and Strömwall (1999):  Liars will merely repeat what they 
have previously said, whereas truth-tellers will change, add and remove information.  Hence, 
consistency may in fact be a sign of lying as opposed to truth-telling (Vredeveldt, van 
Koppen, & Granhag, 2014).   
Experiment 2: Hypothesis 
It is hypothesised that observers being informed about the verifiability approach will 
discriminate significantly better between pairs of truth-tellers and pairs of liars when judging 
veracity based on one collective statement (where consistency is not relevant), than when 
judging veracity based on two individual statements or a combination of individual and 
collective statements (where consistency is relevant) (Hypothesis 4). 
Experiment 2: Method 
Participants  
A total of 57 observers with a mean age of 39.81 years (SD = 15.36) took part in this 
experiment, 25 were male and 32 were female.  All observers who took part in this lie 
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detection experiment were volunteers who were not compensated for participating.  These 
volunteers were recruited using an opportunity sample based on who was available and 
willing to take part.  Hence, participants included members of the public, family and friends, 
and University staff and students who were recruited via word of mouth or in response to an 
advertisement.  Additionally, all observers who took part in this second experiment had not 
partaken as part of any pair in the first experiment.   
Design 
This second experiment was a one-way repeated measures design with Statement 
Type as the within-subjects factor.  This factor consisted of three levels; individual (observer 
makes a veracity judgement having read both individual statements from the pair) versus 
collective (observer makes a veracity judgement having read only the collective statement 
from the pair) versus combined (observer makes a veracity judgement having read both 
individual statements and the collective statement from the pair).  The statements being 
judged in this second experiment were all those produced from the pairs of participants 
within the first experiment (excluding the two lots of statements used as examples; see 
Procedure section below).  All 57 observers made a veracity judgement three times, but no 
observers judged the same pair of participants twice (i.e. the individual statements judged by 
each observer were written by a different pair to the collective statement, which was again 
written by a different pair to the combined statements).  The order in which each observer 
read each statement was counterbalanced as was the number of truth-telling and lying pairs 
that each observer judged (i.e. 27 of the observers judged two lying pairs and one truth-telling 
pair and 30 of the observers judged two truth-telling pairs and one lying pair).  However, no 
observer had only truth-telling pairs or only lying pairs.  The dependent variable for the 
current experiment was the veracity judgements (accuracy rates).   
Running head: APPLYING THE VERIFIABILITY APPROACH 
 
28 
This is an accepted manuscript of an article published by Elsevier in Acta Psychologica, available 
online at https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0001691819302732. It is not the copy 
of record. Copyright © 2020, Elsevier. 
 
Procedure 
Observers were recruited using an opportunity sample and asked to read an 
information sheet about the experiment.  If they were willing to participate, they then signed 
an informed consent form.  Next, observers were provided with (i) information about the 
procedure of the first experiment (i.e. pairs of participants either completed a mission 
together [truth-telling pairs] or separately [lying pairs]), (ii) a definition of ‘alibi witness’, and 
(iii) their task instructions for this second experiment (i.e. to read a variety of statements and 
make a judgement about the veracity status of the pair who wrote the statements). 
Following this, observers were informed about the two different types of statements 
they would be judging; individual statements (pair members are separated to write a 
statement alone) and collective statements (pair members write a statement together).  
Observers were also taught about the verifiability approach and provided with definitions and 
examples of checkable and uncheckable details.  Checkable details (proof pair together) were 
defined to observers as details that could be verified by an investigator to demonstrate that 
the pair were together at a location other than the crime scene at the time the crime took place 
(e.g. “we walked into the park at 2:15pm and bumped into our friend George from rugby”), 
and uncheckable details were defined as details that could not be verified by investigators to 
show the pair were together (e.g. “leaves were falling off the trees in the park”).  Observers 
were told that previous research has found that truth-tellers provide significantly more 
checkable details than liars, whereas liars provide significantly more uncheckable details than 
truth-tellersi.  Finally, participants were shown examples of individual and collective 
statements from one truth-telling pair and one lying pair with the checkable and uncheckable 
details highlighted within the statements.  These example statements were then removed from 
being judged by observers in the actual experiment.  The remaining 171 statements (114 
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individual statements and 57 collective statements) from Experiment 1 were then judged by 
observers in this second experiment.  Observers were told that they should use the 
verifiability approach to make a decision about the veracity status of the statements they will 
be reading.   
Once observers self-reported to understand the verifiable approach (i.e. observers 
merely told the experimenter that they understood the approach and what they had to do), 
they completed a few demographic details and read the statement(s) from their first allocated 
pair.  They then completed a questionnaire and judged the veracity status of this first pair.  
This questionnaire required observers to state whether they thought the pair who wrote the 
statement(s) were lying or telling the truth.  Observers then freely reported (via an open-
ended question) the cues which had helped them make their veracity judgement, and rated on 
a 7-point Likert scale how difficult they found having that particular type of statement (i.e. 
two individual statements or one collective statement or all three statements [two individual 
and one collective]) to determine the veracity status of the pair (from [1] very easy to [7] very 
difficult).  Next, observers judged the statement(s) of another pair and again completed the 
same questionnaire.  Finally, observers judged the statement(s) of a third pair and again 
completed the same questionnaire.  To end the experiment, observers were debriefed and 
provided with the opportunity to ask questions.  Participation lasted approximately 30 
minutes. 
Subjective Coding: Consistency 
 To take into account previous research (e.g. Strömwall & Granhag, 2003; Strömwall, 
et al., 2003; Vredeveldt et al., 2014) and the belief that consistency may have impacted upon 
the veracity judgements made by observers when rating multiple statements from the same 
pair, two coders (blind to the hypotheses and veracity status of the pairs) rated the two 
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individual statements of each pair and the combined statements (two individual and one 
collective) of each pair for consistency (i.e. how similar each statement was to one another).  
Thus, each pair obtained two consistency ratings from each coder on a Likert scale from [1] 
Not at all consistent to [7] Completely consistent.  ICCs were calculated between the two 
individual coders.  The inter-rater reliability between the two coders was good when rating 
the consistency of the individual statements (ICC = .86) and the combined statements (ICC = 
.87), demonstrating strong agreement between the two coders.  The ratings obtained from the 
two coders were then averaged to obtain an averaged consistency rating for the individual 
statements of each pair and an averaged consistency rating for the combined statements of 
each pair.  These mean ratings were then used in future analyses.   
Analysis of Data 
The cues reported to have been used by the 57 observers were coded and computed 
per Statement Type.  A total of 13 different cues were spontaneously mentioned by 
observers: Verifiability (observer mentions details that can or cannot be checked), number of 
details (observer mentions a small or large quantity of details), consistency (observer 
mentions repetitions, contradictions, omissions or commissions), pronouns (observer 
mentions use of ‘I’ or ‘we’), plausibility (observer states that the information was realistic or 
believable), unnecessary details (observer mentions information being irrelevant or not 
needed), feelings/opinions (observer mentions feelings or emotions, such as the pair seemed 
happy and comfortable with one another, or mentions thoughts or opinions being reported by 
the pair), equality (observer mentions either that the pair spoke equally and provided the 
same amount of information or that one member of the pair provided more information than 
the other member), interactions (observer mentions information about the reporting of joint 
experiences or activities that seem to have been carried out together), statement length 
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(observer states that the statement(s) were long or short), overcomplicated information 
(observer mentions details that made the statement too confusing or complicated), specificity 
of information (observer mentions specific details or details that were too general/vague), and 
memory recall (observer mentions how people remember or recall information, or the fact 
that it is normal for some information to be forgotten and written differently by different 
people).  Each cue could only be mentioned once by each observer.  To measure the 
reliability of the coding, a second rater coded the cues reported by 15 observers across the 
three types of statements.  Inter-rater reliability analyses, using the Kappa statistic, revealed 
excellent agreement between the two raters in allocating the cues to the 13 categories across 
each of the three statement types (individual statements: Kappa = .91, p < .001; collective 
statements: Kappa = .90, p < .001; combined statements: Kappa = .82, p < .001).  
Manipulation checks were conducted to explore what cues observers reported to be using to 
make their veracity judgements across the three types of statements.  Additionally, both truth 
accuracy (percentage of true statements that were correctly classified) and lie accuracy 
(percentage of deceptive statements that were correctly classified) were measured for all 57 
observers across the three statement types by giving the observer a 1 if their veracity 
judgement was correct and a 0 if their veracity judgement was incorrect.   
Lens modelling.  Observers’ self-reported use of cues can only inform us about what 
cues they actively considered when making their judgments.  Whilst this can be of interest, 
we also wished to analyse the degree to which the specific cues of (un)checkable details and 
consistency influenced observers’ judgments.  A ‘lens modelling’ approach to analysis (based 
on the work of Ego Brunswik; see Karelaia & Hogarth, 2008) allows for the examination of 
both the presence of cues in the targets and the influence of such cues on observers’ 
judgments.  The analysis uses Pearson’s r correlations to relate the target condition (truth-
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telling pair/lying pair), observer judgment (truth/lie), and presence of (un)checkable details or 
consistency.  The correlation between target condition and observer judgement (frequently 
known as the index of ‘achievement’ in lens models) can be considered an index of 
‘accuracy’.  The presence (or absence) of this accuracy can then be investigated through the 
lens of (un)checkable details or consistency.  For example, if observers are accurate then this 
may be explained by a significant correlation between the presence of checkable details and 
the veracity of the target and a correlation (in the same direction) between the presence of 
checkable details and judgments.  If observers are inaccurate in their judgment, a lens model 
style of analysis can demonstrate if this is due to a lack of relationship between checkable 
details and target (that is, no correlations between the targets’ veracity and the cues) or if this 
is due to the observers not using checkable details for inference (that is, no correlations 
between observers’ judgments and the cues).  Lens models are frequently presented 
graphically (see Figure 1-5) and have previously been explored as an approach to analysing 
deception research data (e.g. in a meta-analysis by Hartwig & Bond, 2011).  To avoid 
concerns about multiple comparisons, data will be analysed by considering the size of 
correlations.  Ferguson's (2009) recommended effect sizes will be used as a guide. 
Experiment 2: Results 
Lie Detection: Accuracy  
The overall accuracy rate was 56.1% across all three types of statement (truth 
accuracy = 56.3%, lie accuracy = 56.0%).  When judging the individual statements, observers 
obtained an accuracy rate of 40.3% (truth accuracy = 34.5%, lie accuracy = 46.4%); when 
judging the collective statements, observers obtained an accuracy rate of 79.0% (truth 
accuracy = 82.8%, lie accuracy = 75.0%); and when judging the combined statements, 
observers obtained an accuracy rate of 49.1% (truth accuracy = 51.7%, lie accuracy = 
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46.4%).  A one-way repeated measures ANOVA was conducted with Statement Type 
(individual vs. collective vs. combined) as the within-subjects factor and accuracy rate as the 
dependent variable.  As with Experiment 1, Bayesian analyses were conducted using the cut-
off points outlined by Jeffreys (1961) to complement the statistical analyses.  The ANOVA 
revealed a significant univariate main effect for Statement Type, F(2, 112) = 10.32, p < .001, 
ηp
2 = .16.  The total accuracy rate of the collective statements (M = .79, SD = .41, 95% CI 
[.68, .90]) was significantly higher than the total accuracy rate of the individual statements 
(M = .40, SD = .49, 95% CI [.27, .53]),  F(1, 56) = 17.29, p < .001, ηp
2 = .24, d = 0.86, 95% 
CI [0.43, 1.19], BF10 = 400.41, and the total  accuracy rate of the combined statements, (M = 
.49, SD = .50, 95% CI [.36, .63]),  F(1, 56) = 12.95, p = .001, ηp
2 = .19, d = 0.66, 95% CI 
[0.24, 0.99], BF10 = 77.24.  The difference in total accuracy rate between the individual 
statements and combined statements was not significant, F(1, 56) = 0.93, p = .340, ηp
2 = .02, 
d = 0.18, 95% CI [-0.20, 0.54], BF10 = 0.22.  The Bayes factor analyses provided very strong 
evidence for the accuracy of collective statements over individual statements and over a 
mixture of both individual and collective statements.  These findings support Hypothesis 4.  
Three one-way between-subjects ANOVAs were conducted to examine whether there were 
significant differences between the accuracy rates for truths and lie within each of the three 
types of statements (individual vs. collective vs. combined).  Hence, these ANOVAs enabled 
us to check for truth or lie biases amongst the observers.  The ANOVAs revealed that there 
were no significant differences in terms of the accuracy rates obtained for truths and lies 
within each of the three statement types (F-values ranged from 0.16 to 0.83; p-values ranges 
from .367 to .696; BF10’s ranged from 0.20 to 0.38). 
Area Under the Curve (AUC) 
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To examine how well observers were able to detect the veracity status of the pairs, 
areas under the curve can be estimated from the sensitivity and specificity values by applying 
the formula developed by Grier (1971). Hence, using the truth accuracy and lie accuracy 
findings above, the AUC values for the individual, collective and combined statements were 
.259, .867 and .481, respectively.  As mentioned in  Experiment 1, the cut-off criteria 
described by Hosmer and Lemeshow (2000) can be used as guidance for interpretation of 
these AUC values.  Our AUC values indicate that observers were excellent at detecting 
veracity when using collective statements and far better at doing so with these statements 
than with the individual or combined statements. 
Observers’ Ratings of Judgement Difficulty 
A repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to examine if there was a significant 
difference between Statement Type (individual vs. collective vs. combined) in terms of how 
difficult the observers found making their veracity judgements based on each type of 
statement.  Statement Type did have a significant effect on observers’ ratings of difficulty, 
F(2, 112) = 4.35, p = .015, ηp
2 = .07.  Observers rated the collective statements (M = 4.67, SD 
= 1.62, CI 95% [4.24, 5.10]) as significantly more difficult for judging veracity than the 
individual statements (M = 4.04, SD = 1.49, CI 95% [3.64, 4.43]), F(1, 56) = 4.40, p = .040, 
ηp
2 = .07, d = 0.40, 95% CI [0.01, 0.75], BF10 = 2.20, and the combined statements (M = 3.82, 
SD = 1.62, CI 95% [3.40, 4.25]), F(1, 56) = 7.41, p = .009, ηp
2 = .12, d = 0.52, 95% CI [0.12, 
0.87], BF10 = 10.79.  No significant difference was found between the individual statements 
and combined statements in terms of difficulty in making veracity judgements (p = .456, BF10 
= 0.26).   
What Cues do Observers Report to use?  
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To explore what cues were the most relevant to observers when making their veracity 
judgements, 13 ANOVAs were conducted with Statement Type (individual vs. collective vs. 
combined) as the only within-subjects factor and each of the 13 self-reported cues as the 
dependent variables.  The ANOVAs revealed significant effects for Statement Type for only 
two of the 13 cues: Verifiability and Consistency.  First, Statement Type did have a 
significant effect on the self-reporting use of the verifiability cue, F(2, 112) = 4.07, p = .020, 
ηp
2 = .07.  Pairwise comparisons demonstrated that observers reported using the verifiability 
cue significantly more frequently when judging the veracity of the collective statement (M 
=.51, SD = .50, CI 95% [.38, .64]) than when judging the veracity of the combined statements 
(M =.30, SD = .46, CI 95% [.18, .42]), F(1, 56) = 9.14, p = .004, ηp
2 = .14, d = 0.44, 95% CI 
[0.04, 0.78], BF10 = 9.90.  No significant differences were found between the use of the 
verifiability cue for the individual statements and collective statements (p = .088, BF10 = 
0.80) or individual statements and combined statements (p = .350, BF10 = 0.30).  Second, a 
closer examination of the consistency cue revealed that no observers reported to have used it 
when judging the collective statements. This finding is not surprising given that observers 
could not use the consistency cue when judging the collective statements. Therefore, a paired 
samples t-test was conducted to examine whether there was a significant difference between 
the individual and combined statements based on the self-reporting use of the consistency 
cue. No significant difference was found between the use of the consistency cue for the 
individual statements (M =.72, SD = .45, CI 95% [.60, .84]) and combined statements (M 
=.75, SD = .43, CI 95% [.64, .87]), p = .641, BF10 = 0.22
ii. 
Lens Modelling: Verifiability 
 The accuracy rates demonstrate that observers were significantly better at judging 
veracity using collective statements than when using individual statements or a combination 
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of individual and collective statements.  We examined to what extent the observers used the 
verifiability approach to inform their veracity judgments of the statements.  Therefore, a lens 
modelling style of analyses were conducted on the data to understand the influence of the 
number of (un)checkable details on observers’ judgements of veracity.  We also conducted 
Bayesian correlation analyses to complement the lens modelling outcomes.  
In the individual statements, collective statements and combined statements, 
statement veracity was positively correlated with checkable details that demonstrated the pair 
were together (p-values equalled .003, < .001, and < .001 respectively;  BF10’s equalled  = 
24.89, 5583.16, and 6848.45 respectively) and negatively correlated with uncheckable details 
(p-values equalled < .001 for all statement types; BF10’s equalled  = 17777.69, 10547.28, and 
331632.02 respectively; see Figures 1, 2 and 3).  This suggests that checkable details that 
demonstrate the pair were together were indicative of truth-telling and uncheckable details 
were indicative of lying.  However, the presence of verifiability cues did not influence 
observers’ veracity judgements of the individual or combined statements:  The correlations 
between detail presence and judgment were not significant (p-values for the individual 
statements equalled .371 (BF10 = 0.09) for checkable details (proof pair together) and .772 
(BF10 = 0.13) for uncheckable details; p-values for the combined statements equalled .436 
(BF10 = 0.35) for checkable details (proof pair together) and .412 (BF10 = 0.10) for 
uncheckable details; see Figures 1 and 3).  Thus, when observers were rating the individual 
statements and combined statements they were not using the verifiability approach to judge 
veracity (r = -.19, p = .152, BF10 = 0.07 for individual statements; r = -.02, p = .891, BF10 = 
0.15 for combined statements).  There is clear evidence that the verifiability approach would 
benefit observers, but observers’ judgments were made with no reference to the abundance of 
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(un)checkable details.  Therefore, it should be of no surprise that judgments made of the 
individual and combined statements were inaccurate. 
Conversely, what is apparent from Figure 2, is that when observers were judging the 
collective statements, they successfully applied the verifiability approach:  Checkable details 
were positively correlated with veracity judgement (r = .30, p = .025, BF10 = 3.82; indicative 
of truth-telling) and uncheckable details were negatively correlated with veracity judgement 
(r = -.45, p < .001, BF10 = 129.32; indicative of lying).  Importantly, the directions of 
correlations were the same on both sides of the model, an indicator of a deceptive statement 
led observers to judge the statement as deceptive and an indicator of a truthful statement led 
observers to judge the statement as truthful.  This finding explains the strong correlation (r = 
.58, p < .001, BF10 = 17568.03) between statement veracity and observers’ judgment; 
observers were correctly using the verifiability approach when judging the collective 
statements.   
INSERT FIGURES 1, 2 AND 3 HERE 
Lens Modelling: Consistency 
 Figures 1 to 3 demonstrate that observers applied the verifiability approach when 
judging the collective statements only, but not when judging only the individual statements or 
the combination of individual and collective statements.  Given that consistency was reported 
to have been used by observers when judging the individual statements and the combination 
of statements but not when judging the collective statements, we conducted further lens 
modelling analyses on the subjective coding of consistency data.  This enabled us to examine 
whether observers automatically used consistency when judging multiple statements (i.e. the 
individual statements and the combination of statements), a cue that could not be utilised 
when judging only the collective statements. 
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In the individual statements and the combined statements, statement veracity was 
negatively correlated with consistency (p-values equalled < .001 and .008 respectively; 
BF10’s equalled = 4229.63 and 4.87 respectively), which suggests that higher consistency was 
indicative of lying (see Figures 4 and 5).  However, in the individual statements, the presence 
of consistency was positively correlated with observers’ veracity judgments (r = .33, p = 
.013, BF10 = 3.42), which suggests that observers associated consistent statements with truth-
telling (see Figure 4).  Hence, observers were utilising the consistency cue incorrectly (i.e. as 
a cue for truthfulness rather than deception), which explains the low accuracy rates obtained 
by observers when judging veracity based on the individual statements only (r = -.19, p = 
.152, BF10 = 0.07).  Conversely, the presence of consistency did not influence observers’ 
veracity judgements of the combined statements:  The correlation between consistency and 
judgement is not significant (r = .16, p = .244, BF10 = 0.32; see Figure 5).  Thus, when 
observers were rating the combination of individual and collective statements they were not 
utilising the consistency cue to judge veracity.  Figure 5 suggests that if the consistency cue is 
used correctly then observers could benefit.  However, because observers were not using 
consistency as a cue to determine the veracity status of the statements (r = -.02, p = .891, 
BF10 = 0.15), the accuracy rates when judging the combination of statements achieved no 
better than chance.   
INSERT FIGURES 4 AND 5 HERE 
Experiment 2: Discussion 
In support of Hypothesis 4, observers were able to apply the verifiability approach to 
better discriminate between truths and lies, but this was only the case when observers were 
judging one collective statement (as opposed to two individual statements or a combination 
of individual and collective statements).  These findings were despite the fact that observers 
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reported that it was more difficult to judge veracity based on the collective statements than to 
judge veracity based on the individual statements or combined statements.  In fact, the 
accuracy rates obtained when applying the verifiability to judge the collective statements 
were high (truth accuracy = 82.8%, lie accuracy = 75.0%) and amongst the highest accuracy 
rates obtained within lie detection research (see Bond & DePaulo, 2006 and Vrij, 2008 for 
reviews).  These high accuracy rates demonstrate the clear potential of using the verifiability 
approach as well as a collective interviewing technique to detect deceit.   
However, interpretation of the AUC values from the ROC curves in Experiment 1 
suggest that observers should be able to classify pairs of truth-tellers and pairs of liars with 
high accuracy, regardless of statement type, but this was not supported by the accuracy rates 
or AUC values obtained in Experiment 2. Hence, the objective detection method of ROC 
curves outperformed human judgement when judging individual and combined statements, 
but was similar when judging collective statements.  This is not surprising because 
Experiment 1 involved the systematic coding of (un)checkable details and so the ROC curves 
were less affected by human factors, such as bias and subjectivity.  Experiment 2, however, 
involved non-systematic human judgements, and despite observers of Experiment 2 being 
taught about the verifiability approach, they still relied on other ‘non-diagnostic’ cues when 
judging the veracity of the individual and combined statements, which ultimately led to lower 
accuracy rates.  
The fact that observers obtained a similar AUC value to that obtained by the ROC 
curves when judging collective statements is not surprising because observers reported to use 
diagnostic cues.  This could mean two things.  First, observers used the verifiability approach 
to its true potential and therefore even observers with minimal training can use the 
verifiability approach efficiently.  Second, observers used a cue other than (un)verifiable 
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details to determine veracity that was highly diagnostic but not taken into account when 
calculating the ROC curves.  We believe that the latter argument is unlikely because 
observers should then have performed better than they did when judging the individual and 
combined statements.  
The lens models in Figures 1 to 5 further support this by showing that (1) the 
verifiability approach does work to aid the detection of deception:  Observers are most 
accurate when they use the verifiability approach to inform their judgments of veracity; (2) 
observers tend to apply the verifiability approach when they only have one statement to read; 
and (3) when observers have access to multiple statements they make their veracity 
judgements using cues, such as consistency, that are not actually indicative of deceit and/or 
by utilising them incorrectly.  Interestingly, the findings generally reflect the cues that the 
observers reported to have used, and as can be seen from the cues reported by observers, the 
main cue utilised when judging multiple statements was consistency (a cue that could not be 
used when judging the collective statements). 
Nevertheless, whilst the lens models demonstrate that observers used the consistency 
cue to judge the veracity of individual statements, they used this cue incorrectly by 
associating consistency with truthfulness and inconsistency with deceit.  Hence, observers 
achieved accuracy rates below chance level when rating multiple individual statements.  This 
supports the previous research and the notion that liars actually prepare and repeat, whilst 
truth-tellers rely on memory and add, change and omit information over time (Granhag & 
Strömwall, 1999; Vredeveldt et al., 2014).  Interestingly, and against what was presumed, not 
only did observers not apply the verifiability approach to the combined statements, but they 
also did not apply the consistency cue accurately.  Based upon the statistical analyses 
conducted, it is unclear what cue(s) observers did apply to the combined statements.  It is 
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possible that observers applied both the consistency and verifiability cues and this hampered 
their judgements.  In fact, the accuracy rates for the combined statements suggest that the 
observers merely guessed (achieving accuracy rates of around 50%).  When the observers had 
three statements (as they did in the combined condition) it is highly probable that they 
became confused especially because the collective statement was often a mixture of the 
information provided within each individual statement.  Moreover, when the coders were 
rating the combined statements for consistency, both coders independently stated that they 
had difficulty when rating the consistency of the three statements (often the collective 
statement consisted of 50% of one individual statement and 50% of the other individual 
statement leading the coders to frequently rate the statements for consistency at the mid-point 
of 4 on the Likert scale).  Therefore, although observers reported to have used consistency 
when judging the combined statements, it is likely that they found this difficult to apply and 
therefore applied both the verifiability and consistency cue or alternatively just guessed the 
veracity status of the pair.   
Overall, the predictive accuracy of consistency is low, yet both lay people and legal 
professionals utilise consistency as a cue to deceit and hold the stereotypical (incorrect) belief 
that consistency implies truth-telling and inconsistency implies deceit (Granhag et al., 2003; 
Strömwall, et al., 2003; Vrij, Mann, et al, 2010).  Therefore, lie detectors need to be trained to 
focus on alternative cues that are more predictive of deception.  Such cues should be 
checkable and uncheckable details.  Additionally, lie detectors need to be taught to avoid 
utilising the consistency cue when they have access to multiple statements.  This will be a 
challenging task for real-world investigators who, as part of enforced protocol, frequently 
collect multiple statements during investigations.  Hence, we suggest that investigators 
should hold off making a judgement until a collective statement has been gathered and/or 
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should bring in a deception detection expert to help with the investigation and the analysing 
of the available statements.   
General Discussion 
The two experiments showed that the verifiability approach can be used to 
discriminate between pairs of truth-tellers and pairs of liars and that observers are able to 
apply this approach most reliably when judging collective statements only.  We further 
showed that when observers judged multiple statements, they used consistency in addition or 
instead of verifiability.  This is problematic mostly because the observers used the 
consistency cue incorrectly, based on the stereotypical belief that consistency implies truth 
and inconsistency implies deceit.   
The ROC curves highlighted the potential efficiency of the verifiability approach for 
judging veracity regardless of statement type and therefore further research should examine 
whether training observers to quantify the proportions of (un)checkable details and use these 
measures in a standardised manner improves the ability of observers to apply the verifiability 
approach correctly to all statement types.  
Study Limitations 
Whilst the current study demonstrates the potential of applying the verifiability 
approach and collective interviewing to lie detection, there are several limitations that we 
need to acknowledge.  First, in Experiment 1, we did not manipulate the order of recall and 
therefore all pairs of participants first completed individual statements then completed 
collective statements.  The reason we chose to do this sequence of recall was because we 
believe it to be the best order:  Not only does it reflect real-life situations (e.g. at international 
airports or in the investigation of sham marriages), but the reverse order may affect memory 
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as the members of the pair will be able to discuss and jog each other’s memories during the 
collective recall in preparation for the individual recall.  
Second, the current study was a laboratory experiment involving a mock crime and a 
fake investigator.  Whilst this is common practice in deception detection research (e.g. Nahari 
& Vrij, 2014; Granhag, Mac Giolla, Strömwall, & Rangmar, 2013; Vrij et al., 2009), it does 
lack ecological validity (a limitation of all mock crime deception studies).  Consequently, 
although participants were not specifically informed, it is likely that the participants knew it 
was a mock crime, knew they were not actually being accused of a crime, and knew there 
was not a real investigator.  Nevertheless, ethically it is not possible to conduct a real crime 
and in real-life it is difficult to establish ground truth, and so it is necessary to conduct 
laboratory studies to learn more about lie detection cues and techniques before they are 
applied to practice.  The artificial setting of a mock crime has been studied in the context of 
the Concealed Information Test (CIT) whereby participants were either instructed to cheat or 
to cheat using their own initiative.  It was found that the validity of the CIT was not restricted 
to instructed cheating and that the detection of cheating using the CIT was comparable across 
both conditions (see Geven, Ben-Shakhar, Kindt & Verschuere, 2018; Geven, Klein Selle, 
Ben-Shakhar, Kindt & Verschuere, 2018). These studies offer promise to the validity of 
deception detection laboratory studies and the applicability of such studies to the real-world.  
Additionally, although the current study was a laboratory study with a mock crime, it is 
reasonable to expect that the verifiability approach will be even stronger in real-life.  This is 
because liars who provide false checkable details are in fact bluffing.  They may bluff in 
experimental studies because they may think that the investigator is not likely to check the 
details they provide.  In real-life, however, liars will probably assess the likelihood that the 
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investigator will check their details to be much higher; hence, this may make them less 
willing to bluff in real-life settings than in laboratory settings.   
Third, the participants in Experiment 1 received detailed and specific instructions.  
The reasons for such comprehensive instructions was to make the statements of truth-tellers 
and liars comparable (other than veracity) and to establish ground truth.  However, note that 
we gave instructions about the mission only, not about what truth-tellers and liars should say 
during the interview.  Nevertheless, we cannot rule out that these detailed instructions may 
have influenced the recall of information.  Future research could examine the impact of 
instructions on the ability of pairs to provide verifiable details within their statements.  
Fourth, observers in Experiment 2 were naïve observers as opposed to expert 
investigators.  Therefore, one could argue that had the observers been professionals, the 
findings of the current study would be different.  However, previous research has shown that 
deception detection abilities of professionals are no better than lay people (see Vrij, 2008).  
Furthermore, we see no reason why the type of observer (i.e. laypersons vs. police officers) 
would change the accuracy differences obtained in the current study between different types 
of statement (e.g. collective vs. individual) nor is there any theoretical reason why 
professionals would be more effective at applying the verifiability approach to statements 
than lay people.  However, future research should examine the ability of ‘expert’ observers 
(e.g. police officers) to apply the verifiability approach for identifying veracity across 
different types of statements, and should examine whether training observers about the 
limitations of the consistency cue improves their ability to successfully apply other, more 
diagnostics cues (e.g. checkable details) in order to more accurately judge the veracity status 
of statements. 
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Fifth, during Experiment 2 all observers were trained in the verifiability approach.  
This meant we had no control group to examine whether observers naturally applied this 
approach or to measure the degree in which the training improved performance.  Although 
this is a limitation in experimental terms, we do not consider this to be a limitation in 
practical terms.  A crucial prerequisite in testing the efficacy of the Verifiability Approach, 
and, in fact, of any lie detection method, is that users should be informed and trained in the 
working of the lie detection method under investigation.  Furthermore, our claim that the 
verifiability approach improves the detection of deception is based on the finding that when 
participants used the verifiability approach they performed better than when they did not.  It 
was not based on the verifiability approach training.  Therefore, a control group is not 
necessary for our claim.   
Finally, it is important to recognise that, in the current study, the verifiability 
approach aided the performance of observers when assessing collective statements of an alibi 
witness scenario only. This is just one context and therefore, until more research is 
conducted, it remains unclear whether the approach can be applied to other contexts.  
Previous research has successfully applied the verifiability approach to the gathering of 
information from individual suspects (Nahari et al., 2014a, 2014b). 
Conclusion 
 The current study adds to the validity of the verifiability approach, demonstrating that 
it can be applied to alibi witness situations.  Truth-telling pairs provide significantly more 
checkable details that demonstrate they were together (particularly during a collective 
statement), whereas lying pairs provide significantly more uncheckable details.  When 
observers are taught about the verifiability approach, the collective statement facilitates their 
ability to more accurately distinguish between pairs of liars and pairs of truth-tellers.  This 
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appears to be because observers do not have the option to use the consistency cue when 
judging only one statement, a cue which they utilise automatically especially when judging 


















Amado, B. G., Arce, R., & Fariña, F. (2015). Undeutsch hypothesis and Criteria Based 
Content Analysis: A meta-analytic review. The European Journal of Psychology 
Applied to Legal Context, 7, 3-12. DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpal.2014.11.002. 
Running head: APPLYING THE VERIFIABILITY APPROACH 
 
47 
This is an accepted manuscript of an article published by Elsevier in Acta Psychologica, available 
online at https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0001691819302732. It is not the copy 
of record. Copyright © 2020, Elsevier. 
 
Amado, B.G., Arce, R., Fariña, F., & Vilariño, M.  (2016).  Criteria-Based Content Analysis 
(CBCA) reality criteria in adults: A meta-analytic review.  International Journal of 
Clinical and Health Psychology, 16, 201-210.  DOI: 10.1016/j.ijchp.2016.01.002. 
Bartlett, F.C.  (1932).  Remembering: A study in experimental and social psychology.  
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Bond, C.F., & DePaulo, B.M.  (2006).  Accuracy of deception judgements.  Personality and 
Social Psychology Review, 10, 214-234.  DOI:  10.1207/s15327957pspr1003_2. 
Burke, T.  M., & Turtle, J.  W.  (2003).  Alibi evidence in criminal investigations and trials: 
Psychological and legal factors.  Canadian Journal of Police and Security Services, 3, 
286-294. 
Burke, T., Turtle, J.W., & Olsen, E.  (2007).  Alibis in criminal investigations and trials.  In 
M.P.  Toglia, J.D.  Read, D.F.  Ross, & R.C.L.  Lindsay (Eds.), The handbook of 
eyewitness psychology, Vol.  1: Memory for events (pp.  157-174).  Mahwah, NJ: 
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Culhane, S.E., Hosch, H.M., & Kehn, A.  (2008).  Alibi generation: Data from U.S.  
Hispanics and U.S.  non-Hispanic Whites.  Journal of Ethnicity in Criminal Justice, 6, 
177-199.  DOI: 10.1080/15377930802243395. 
Culhane, S.E., Kehn, A., Horgan, A.J., Meissner, C.A., Hosch, H.M., & Wodahl, E.J.  (2013).  
Generation and detection of true and false alibi statements.  Psychiatry, Psychology 
and Law, 20, 619-638.  DOI: 10.1080/13218719.2012.729018. 
Dahl, L.  C., & Price, H.  L.  (2012).  “He couldn’t have done it, he was with me!”: The 
impact of alibi witness age and relationship.  Applied Cognitive Psychology, 26, 475-
481.  DOI: 10.1002/acp.2821. 
Running head: APPLYING THE VERIFIABILITY APPROACH 
 
48 
This is an accepted manuscript of an article published by Elsevier in Acta Psychologica, available 
online at https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0001691819302732. It is not the copy 
of record. Copyright © 2020, Elsevier. 
 
Driskell, J.E., Salas, E., & Driskell, T.  (2012).  Social indicators of deception.  Human 
Factors: The Journal of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society, 54, 577-588.  
DOI: 10.1177/0018720812446338. 
Ferguson, C.J.  (2009).  An effect size primer: A guide for clinicians and researchers.  
Professional Psychology: Research and Practice, 40, 532-538.  DOI: 
10.1037/a0015808. 
Granhag, P.A., Mac Giolla, E., Strömwall, L.A., & Rangmar, J. (2013). Counter-interrogation 
strategies among small cells of suspects. Psychiatry, Psychology, and Law, 20, 705-
712. DOI: 10.1080/13218719.2012.729021. 
Granhag, P.A., & Strömwall, L.A.  (1999).  Repeated interrogations: Stretching the deception 
detection paradigm.  Expert Evidence, 7, 163-174.  DOI: 10.1023/A:1008993326434. 
Granhag, P.A., & Strömwall, L.A.  (2000).  Deception detection: Examining the consistency 
heuristic.  In C.M.  Breur, M.M.  Kommer, J.F.  Nijboer, & J.M.  Reintjes (Eds.), New 
trends in criminal investigation and evidence II (pp.  309-321).  Antwerp, Belgium: 
Intersentia.   
Granhag, P.A., Strömwall, L.A., & Jonsson, A.C.  (2003).  Partners in crime: How liars in 
collusion betray themselves.  Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 33, 848-868.  
DOI: 10.1111/j.1559-1816.2003.tb01928.x. 
Grier, J.B. (1971). Nonparametric indexes for sensitivity and bias: Computing formulas. 
Psychological Bulletin, 75, 424-429. DOI: 10.1037/h0031246 
Geven, L.M., Ben-Shakhar, G., Kindt, M., & Verschuere, B. (2018). Memory-based 
deception detection: Extending the cognitive signature of lying from instructed to self-
initiated cheating. Topics in Cognitive Science, 1–24. DOI: 10.1111/tops.12353. 
Running head: APPLYING THE VERIFIABILITY APPROACH 
 
49 
This is an accepted manuscript of an article published by Elsevier in Acta Psychologica, available 
online at https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0001691819302732. It is not the copy 
of record. Copyright © 2020, Elsevier. 
 
Geven, L.M., Klein Selle, N., Ben-Shakhar, G., Kindt, M., & Verschuere, B. (2018). Self-
initiated versus instructed cheating in the physiological Concealed Information Test. 
Biological Psychology, 138, 146–155. DOI: 10.1016/j.biopsycho.2018.09.005.  
Hartwig, M., & Bond, C.F.  (2011).  Why do lie-catchers fail? A lens model meta-analysis of 
human lie judgments.  Psychological Bulletin, 137, 643-659.  DOI: 
10.1037/a0023589. 
Hollingshead, A. B. (1998). Retrieval processes in transactive memory systems. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 74, 659-671. DOI: 10.1037/0022-3514.74.3.659. 
Home Office. (2013). Sham marriages and civil partnerships: Background information and 
proposed referral and investigation scheme. Retrieved from: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/ 
256257/Sham_Marriage_and_Civil_Partnerships.pdf. 
Hosmer, D.W., & Lemeshow, S. (2000). Applied Logistic Regression (2nd Ed.). New York: 
John Wiley and Sons. 
Hosch, H.M., Culhane, S.E., Jolly, K.W., Chavez, R.M., & Shaw, L.H.  (2011). Effects of an 
alibi witness’ relationship to the defendant on mock jurors’ judgments.  Law and 
Human Behavior, 35, 127-142.  DOI: 10.1007/s10979-010-9225-5. 
Jarosz, A.F., & Wiley, J. (2014). What are the odds? A practical guide to computing and 
reporting Bayes factors. The Journal of Problem Solving, 7, 2–9. DOI: 10.7771/1932-
6246.1167. 
Jeffreys, H. (1961). Theory of probability. Oxford: UK Oxford University Press.  
Karelaia, N., & Hogarth, R.M.  (2008).  Determinants of linear judgment: A meta-analysis of 
lens model studies.  Psychological Bulletin, 134, 404–426.  DOI:10.1037/0033-
2909.134.3.404. 
Running head: APPLYING THE VERIFIABILITY APPROACH 
 
50 
This is an accepted manuscript of an article published by Elsevier in Acta Psychologica, available 
online at https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0001691819302732. It is not the copy 
of record. Copyright © 2020, Elsevier. 
 
Lakens, D. (2016). Power analysis for default Bayesian t‐tests [blog post]. Retrieved from: 
https://daniellakens.blogspot.com/2016/01/power-analysis-for-default-bayesian-
t.html.  
Lee, M.D., & Wagenmakers, E.J. (2013). Bayesian cognitive modeling: A practical course. 
Cambridge University Press.  
Loftus, E.F.  (2005).  Planting misinformation in the human mind: A 30-year investigation of 
the malleability of memory.  Learning and Memory, 12, 361-366.  DOI: 
10.1101/lm.94705. 
Mossman, D. (1994). Assessing predictions of violence: Being accurate about accuracy. 
Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 62, 783-792. DOI: 10.1037//0022-
006x.62.4.783. 
Nahari, G., & Pazulo, M. (2015). Telling a convincing story: Richness in detail as a function 
of gender and information. Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition, 
4, 363-367. DOI: 10.1016/j.jarmac.2015.08.005. 
Nahari, G., & Vrij, A.  (2014).  Can I borrow your alibi? The applicability of the verifiability 
approach to the case of an alibi witness.  Journal of Applied Research in Memory and 
Cognition, 3, 89-94.  DOI: 10.1016/j.jarmac.2014.04.005. 
Nahari, G.  & Vrij, A.  (2015).  Systematic errors (biases) in applying verbal lie detection 
tools: Richness in detail as a test case.  Crime Psychology Review, 1, 98-107.  DOI: 
10.1080/23744006.2016.1158509. 
Nahari, G., Vrij, A., & Fisher, R.P.  (2012).  Does the truth come out in the writing? Scan as a 
lie detection tool.  Law and Human Behavior, 36, 68-76.  DOI: 10.1037/h0093965. 
Running head: APPLYING THE VERIFIABILITY APPROACH 
 
51 
This is an accepted manuscript of an article published by Elsevier in Acta Psychologica, available 
online at https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0001691819302732. It is not the copy 
of record. Copyright © 2020, Elsevier. 
 
Nahari, G., Vrij, A., & Fisher, R.P.  (2014a).  Exploiting liars’ verbal strategies by examining 
the verifiability of details.  Legal and Criminological Psychology, 19, 227-239.  DOI: 
10.1111/j.2044-8333.2012.02069.x. 
Nahari, G., Vrij, A., & Fisher, R.P.  (2014b).  The verifiability approach: Countermeasures 
facilitate its ability to discriminate between truths and lies.  Applied Cognitive 
Psychology, 28, 122-128.  DOI: 10.1002/acp.2974.   
Potter, R., & Brewer, N.  (1999).  Perceptions of witness behaviour-accuracy relationships 
held by police, lawyers and mock-jurors.  Psychiatry, Psychology & Law, 6, 97-103.  
DOI: 10.1080/13218719909524952. 
Strömwall, L.A., & Granhag, P.A.  (2003).  How to detect deception? Arresting the beliefs of 
police officers, prosecutors and judges.  Psychology, Crime & Law, 9, 19-36.  DOI: 
10.1080/10683160308138. 
Strömwall, L.A., Granhag, P.A., & Jonsson, A.C.  (2003).  Deception among pairs: “Let’s say 
we had lunch and hope they will swallow it!” Psychology, Crime & Law, 9, 109-124.  
DOI: 10.1080/1068316031000116238. 
Vernham, Z., & Vrij, A. (2015). A review of the collective interviewing approach to 
detecting deception in pairs. Crime Psychology Review, 1, 43-58. DOI: 
10.1080/23744006.2015.1051756.  
Vernham, Z., Vrij, A., Mann, S., Leal, S., & Hillman, J. (2014). Collective interviewing: 
Eliciting cues to deceit using a turn-taking approach. Psychology, Public Policy and 
Law, 20, 309-324. DOI: 10.1037/law0000015. 
Vredeveldt, A., van Koppen.  P.J., & Granhag, P.A.  (2014).  The inconsistent suspect: A 
systematic review of different types of consistency in truth tellers and liars.  In R.Bull 
(Eds.), Investigative interviewing (pp.  183-207).  New York: Springer. 
Running head: APPLYING THE VERIFIABILITY APPROACH 
 
52 
This is an accepted manuscript of an article published by Elsevier in Acta Psychologica, available 
online at https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0001691819302732. It is not the copy 
of record. Copyright © 2020, Elsevier. 
 
Vrij, A.  (2008).  Detecting lies and deceit: Pitfalls and opportunities (2nd Ed.).  Chichester: 
John Wiley & Sons.   
Vrij, A. (2016). Baselining as a lie detection method. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 30, 
1112-1119. DOI: 10.1002/acp.3288. 
Vrij, A., Granhag, P.A., & Porter, S. (2010). Pitfalls and opportunities in nonverbal and 
verbal lie detection. Psychological Science in the Public Interest, 11, 89-121. DOI: 
10.1177/1529100610390861. 
Vrij, A., Jundi, S., Hope, L., Hillman, J., Gahr, E., Leal, S., Warmelink, L., Mann, S., 
Vernham, Z., & Granhag, P.A.  (2012).  Collective interviewing of suspects.  Journal 
of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition, 1, 41-44.  DOI: 
10.1016/j.jarmac.2011.12.002. 
Vrij, A., Leal, S., Granhag, P.A., Mann, S., Fisher, R.P., Hillman, J., & Sperry, K. (2009). 
Outsmarting the liars: The benefit of asking unanticipated questions. Law and Human 
Behavior, 33, 159-166. DOI: 10.1007/s10979-008-9143-y. 
Vrij, A., Mann, S., Leal., S., & Granhag, P.A.  (2010).  Getting into the minds of pairs of liars 
and truth-tellers: An examination of their strategies.  The Open Criminology Journal, 
3, 17-22.  DOI: 10.2174/1874917801003010017. 
Wegner, D. M. (1987). Transactive Memory: A contemporary analysis of the group mind. In 




Running head: APPLYING THE VERIFIABILITY APPROACH 
 
53 
This is an accepted manuscript of an article published by Elsevier in Acta Psychologica, available online at 
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0001691819302732. It is not the copy of record. Copyright © 2020, Elsevier. 
 
Table 1: Veracity main effects obtained from the self-report data collected in the pre- and post-questioning questionnaires. 
Variable Truth-tellers  
Mean (SD) 95% CI 
Liars 
Mean (SD) 95%CI 
F p  d (95% CI) BF10 







4.92 (2.15) 4.23 – 5.60 
4.75 (2.09) 4.00 – 5.50  
5.33 (2.35) 4.59 – 6.08 
5.25 (2.26) 4.55 – 5.95  
4.42 (2.19) 3.59 – 5.24 
 
6.19 (0.87) 5.88 – 6.50 
5.60 (1.06) 5.26 – 5.94 
5.65 (0.95) 5.32 – 6.00 
5.81 (0.85) 5.49 – 6.13  














0.77 (0.35, 1.10) 
0.51 (0.11, 0.85) 
0.18 (-0.19, 0.53) 
0.33 (-0.06, 0.67) 









Confidence: Receive £10 
Confidence: Write further statement 
Difficulty: Individual statement 
Difficulty: Collective statement 
Truthfulness: Individual statement 
Truthfulness: Collective statement 
 
5.27 (1.70) 4.92 – 5.61  
6.37 (0.74) 6.09 – 6.65  
2.37 (1.38) 2.00 – 2.73 
2.58 (1.71) 2.13 – 3.03 
2.38 (1.44) 1.97 – 2.80 
100% (0.00) 97.68 – 102.32 
100% (0.00) 96.23 – 103.77 
 
6.16 (0.87) 5.80 – 6.51 
4.93 (1.37) 4.64 – 5.22 
3.71 (1.50) 3.33 – 4.08 
3.33 (1.79) 2.87 – 3.78  
3.55 (1.79) 3.13 – 3.98 
38.45% (39.86) 36.09 – 40.81 


















0.66 (0.25, 0.99) 
1.31 (0.84, 1.63) 
0.93 (0.50, 1.25) 
0.43 (0.04, 0.77) 
0.72 (0.31, 1.05) 
2.20 (1.63, 2.52) 









*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .005; ****p < .001 
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Table 2: Veracity X Statement interaction effect for percentage of checkable details (proof pair together). 





d (95% CI) 
 
Mean (SD) 95% CI Mean (SD) 95% CI BF10 
Truth-tellers .27 (.16) .21 – .31 .41 (.22) .34 – .48 17.67 <.001* 0.73 (0.16, 1.21) 29.09 





Running head: APPLYING THE VERIFIABILITY APPROACH 
 
55 
This is an accepted manuscript of an article published by Elsevier in Acta Psychologica, available 
online at https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0001691819302732. It is not the copy 
of record. Copyright © 2020, Elsevier. 
 
Table 3: Area under the ROC curves computed for each type of statement 
Statement AUC SE 95% CI 
All (combined) .876* .05 .78, .97 
Individual .789* .06 .67, .91 
Collective .895* .05 .80, .99 
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i Checkable details (other) was not included as a variable in this second experiment because, 
in the first experiment, we did not predict, or find, any differences between truth-tellers and 
liars regarding this variable.   
ii The 11 ANOVA’s that were conducted on the remaining 11 cues that were mentioned by 
observers when making their veracity judgements revealed no significant findings: Statement 
type did not have an effect on the self-reporting of number of details, pronouns, plausibility, 
unnecessary details, feelings/opinions, equality, interactions, statement length, 
overcomplicated information, specificity of information, or memory recall. 
                                                          
